Medical Liability Reform in the United States: A Comprehensive Approach to Medical Error by Muller, James Gerard
Proceedings of GREAT Day
Volume 2012 Article 10
2013
Medical Liability Reform in the United States: A
Comprehensive Approach to Medical Error
James Gerard Muller
SUNY Geneseo
Follow this and additional works at: https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the GREAT Day at KnightScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Proceedings of
GREAT Day by an authorized editor of KnightScholar. For more information, please contact KnightScholar@geneseo.edu.
Recommended Citation
Muller, James Gerard (2013) "Medical Liability Reform in the United States: A Comprehensive Approach to Medical Error,"
Proceedings of GREAT Day: Vol. 2012 , Article 10.
Available at: https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2012/iss1/10
 171 
 
Medical liability, also referred to as “medical malpractice,” is a form of professional 
negligence in which the treatment a health care provider administers falls below the accepted 
standard of practice in the medical community, thereby causing injury or death to a patient. In 
the United States, malpractice is resolved through the process of litigation. If a patient has reason 
to believe he or she is a victim of malpractice, the patient has the legal ability to file a lawsuit. 
The legal remedy patient-plaintiffs seek is monetary compensation, measured by “economic 
loss” or financial loss and damage suffered by a person (Kessler 93–110). For a physician-
defendant to be convicted of malpractice, the plaintiff’s counsel carries the burden of proving: 
(1) the relationship between the plaintiff (patient) and defendant (physician) gave rise to a duty, 
(2) the defendant was negligent—meaning his care fell below the standard expected, (3) the 
plaintiff suffered an injury, and (4) the injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence (Mello, 
Studdert 11–12). 
 Medical liability insurance is a commodity health care providers purchase in the event 
that they need to compensate a patient. Medical liability crises are understood as the result of 
sharp rises in the cost of liability insurance premiums for health care providers. In recent years, 
roughly from the years 2002–2005, the United States has experienced a malpractice crisis (Sloan 
and Chepke). What exactly created the recent medical liability insurance crisis remains in 
dispute.  
 Medical malpractice and medical liability insurance have been the topic of American 
policy debate from time to time. The topic’s prevalence in American politics and policy debate 
result from a unanimous agreement among policy makers, scholars, physicians, and the educated 
public, that the medical malpractice system as it stands, is operating inadequately. There has 
been a general agreement as to what the central flaws of the current medical liability system are: 
(1) heavy financial burdens associated with insurance and (2) a disregard for patient safety and 
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reducing medical error. Admittedly, these problems are prioritized differently—some view the 
financial complications associated with medical liability as the most important concern, whereas 
others view medical error and patient safety as what deserves the greatest attention. Before 
addressing these concerns with considerable detail, it is first imperative to gain insight on how 
the litigation process works. 
Malpractice Claims and the Litigation Process 
 Only 1 in 8 people injured by medical negligence file a malpractice claima, and of those 
claims filed, only thirty percent reach court (Mello and Studdert 13). According to the landmark 
Harvard Medical Practice Study (1990), only 1 in 15 patients who are victims of malpractice 
receive compensation, and many cases awarded compensation have no evidence of negligence 
(Kessler 96). Understanding these facts, the problem is obvious: many victims of malpractice are 
uncompensated, and the money that is given out does not go to the correct beneficiaries. The 
purpose of medical malpractice litigation is to compensate victims, and to deter physicians from 
practicing medicine in a complacent manner (Kessler 94; Mello and Studdert 17). Litigation has 
failed its purpose of providing compensation to those whom deserve it. In addition, litigation 
does not have the deterrent effect many assume it does; as Mello and Studdert have noted, the 
deterrent effect of the tort system rests on too many assumptions (17). One of the largest 
assumptions, litigation as a form of deterrence, makes is that physicians are always rational 
actors, performing some sort of hedonic calculus (Mello and Studdert 18). The second 
assumption the deterrence claim makes is that physicians internalize the costs of their own 
negligence (18). 
 Realizing litigation fails in accomplishing its two core purposes, the question that needs 
to be asked is: Should the medical malpractice compensation system continue to rely on 
litigation? Medical malpractice, placed in the context of litigation, is an adversarial process. Is an 
adversarial process in everyone’s best interest? These are important questions policy makers 
must ask themselves, and they are questions constituents ought to ask policy makers. As it 
stands, malpractice’s confrontational nature is a concern that requires considerable attention, and 
will be addressed detail throughout this paper.  
Common Misconceptions With Respect to Malpractice 
                                                
a American Association for Justice, Five Myths About Medical Negligence 
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 Before addressing the two concerns laid out thus far, it is essential to know what scholars 
widely regard as “misconceptions” with respect to medical malpractice. The first, and perhaps 
the principal misunderstanding, is that frivolous claims are abundant. “The epidemic is medical 
negligence, not lawsuits.” b As already discussed, many victims of negligence do not sue. A 
study conducted by researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health found that of 1,400 
closed medical negligence claims, 97 % were meritorious.c In many cases, patients are filing 
claims in hopes to discover what went wrong during surgery, because the information was not 
disclosed by the physician. 
 The presupposition has been made that malpractice claims drive up health care costs. The 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) finds such a claim baseless, with 
factual information leading to a contrary finding. “The total spent defending claims and 
compensating victims of medical negligence in 2007 was $7.1 billion—just 0.3% of health care 
costs,” claims the NAIC.d A similar argument, that malpractice claims drive up doctors’ 
premiums, has been widely criticized as well. Medical malpractice insurance is not strongly 
correlated with experience-rating (history of claims), and many academics and health policy 
economists see malpractice premiums influenced by insurance cycles more than anything (Mello 
and Studdert 13–14; Sloan and Chepke 27–31).e  
 Proponents of the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) 
Act of 2012, also referred to as “H.R.5,” support the Congressional Bill on the premise “tort 
reform will lower insurance rates, and improve patient access to health care services.”f Ironically, 
the Bill’s text seems to protect physicians’ self-interest more than patients. Contrary to the notion 
of “improving the liability system for patients,” expressed in the preface of the legislation’s text, 
H.R.5 limits a patient’s legal rights by putting damage caps on malpractice lawsuits. It is 
assumed a bill with such a high marginal cost, limiting patients’ rights, would produce an even 
greater marginal benefit—tort reform lowering insurance rates. The causal relationship between 
tort reform and a lower insurance rate has been in serious question for many scholars in the 
health policy field. Obviously, if damage caps are in place, insurers will be paying out less 
money to victims of malpractice; however, the assumption that they will pass their savings along 
                                                
b American Association for Justice, Five Myths About Medical Negligence 
c Mello & Studdert, Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation 
d American Association for Justice, Five Myths About Medical Negligence 
e American Association for Justice, Five Myths About Medical Negligence 
f (HEALTH) Act of 2012, Introduction 
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to doctors by lowering premiums is unsupportedg. According to research compiled by the 
American Association for Justice, states that have cap damages and states that do not, have little 
variance in premiums. The statistics make it clear that the cap-on-damage approach has done 
nothing to reduce health care costs.   
The final issue regarding misconceptions is the concept of “defensive medicine.” Also 
referred to as assurance behavior and avoidance behavior, this term can be understood as the 
workups physicians do (and do not do), respectively, that are influenced by liability pressures. 
Some scholars in the field, those very adamant about patient safety and strongly in opposition of 
tort reform (in other words, the most liberal of health policy scholars), claim defensive medicine 
is the biggest myth and largest over-exaggeration in the malpractice policy debate. Another 
thought, one that some reports bring to our attention, speculate that what doctors claim to be 
defensive medicine may be a way physicians generate income.h Mello and Studdert, whom could 
still definitely be characterized as “opposed to tort reform,” are a little more diplomatic in their 
approach to defensive medicine, calling it a “slippery concept” and claiming measuring it is 
“notoriously difficult” (Mello and Studdert 23). Mello and Studdert make a good point—
defensive medicine is a very hard concept to operationalize; after all, when treating a patient, 
where does “high-quality care” end and “liability motivations” begin? Scholars like Daniel P. 
Kessler have contributed research on defensive medicine’s prominence that has been largely 
disputed by a wide range of colleagues.i With such strong assertions on both ends of the political 
spectrum, and with no strong methodological process to measure assurance or avoidance 
behavior’s prevalence in medicine, there is no way to truly understand the reality of the 
“defensive medicine” concept. 
The Facts and Figures of Medical Liability 
 With no clear consensus on the legitimacy of defensive medicine, perhaps it makes more 
sense to draw our attention to the facts well understood about medical liability and defensive 
medicine. The fact is, assuming arguendo, that defensive medicine does exist, and it contributes 
to health expenditures by as much as $50 billion dollars (a very generous estimate), eliminating 
defensive medicine would be nearly impossible. How can policy makers seek eliminating 
something of such an abstract form? The supposition is that caps-on-damages will reduce health 
                                                
g American Association for Justice, Five Myths About Medical Negligence 
h Congressional Budget Office, 2004  
i American Association for Justice, The Truth About Defensive Medicine 
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care providers’ fear of medical malpractice claims. The flaw in this reasoning is that doctors fear 
more than merely economic sanctions; a caps-on-damages proposal does absolutely nothing for 
the noneconomic costs associated with a malpractice lawsuit (i.e. negative publicity associated 
with being involved in a malpractice lawsuit). Considering the fact that these risks cannot 
dissolve with a “caps-on-damages tort reform approach,” the practice of defensive medicine will 
continue. 
 An undisputed fact of medical liability is that preventable medical errors contribute to 
billions of dollars in health care expenditures. In 2000, the Institute of Medicine disclosed 
research regarding the health care system in a report titled “To Err Is Human.” The report 
claimed “at least 44,000 people, and perhaps as many as 98,000 people, die in hospitals each 
year as a result of medical errors that could have been prevented.”j The Institute of Medicine 
reports that the costs associated with these errors are thought to be as high as $29 billion 
annually.k Because “preventable medical errors” is a more concrete, realistic concept than 
defensive medicine, policy makers ought to focus their attention more effectively on something 
known to exist, and on something that, if largely resolved, could have the same fiscal effect as 
“eliminating defensive medicinel.” 
 In attempt to resolve any confusion up to this point, while at the same time not over-
simplifying the situation and dichotomizing the diagnosis of the malpractice system, obvious 
points can be made. Those that see the system’s flaws, including too many lawsuits and the 
inner-workings of defensive medicine as a result of “fear of liability,” argue for a tort reform 
approach. Others, those viewing the malpractice system’s flaws as disregarding patient safety 
and not working vigorously enough to limit medical error, advocate for more comprehensive 
reform approaches. More “comprehensive” reform approaches steer away from tort and litigation 
in general, viewing the adversarial process skeptically. They see the reform approaches they 
advocate for limiting liability costs in the long run; the argument goes: obviously, if you reduce 
the amount of medical error, the amount of liability cases will also subside. Before shifting focus 
to the two contending approaches of medical liability reform, and examining their differences, 
                                                
jKohn, L.T., Corrigan J.M., & Donaldson, M.S., To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health Care System 
k American Association for Justice, The Truth About Defensive Medicine 
l Reducing medical error could directly lower costs by about 30 billion, and indirectly have a large impact as well, 
way beyond the fiscal benefits of “eliminating” defensive medicine.  
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analyzing points of consensus among scholars, policy makers, and the educated public is 
essential to conceptually forming the policy debate. 
 The medical malpractice tort-run system, as it stands, is problematic—this fact has been 
established by anyone that has invested research in the current medical liability system. The 
system tries to meet its goals of compensation; deterrence; corrective justice; and efficiency, but 
fails miserably in most cases. In respect to corrective justice, advocates of both approaches note 
that medical liability fears inhibit quality of care improvements. Proponents of both reform 
approaches also agree that the recent medical liability insurance crisis is not a unique experience 
of the 21st century. Within the past four decades, experts assert that we have experienced three 
medical liability insurance crises: the first in the late 1960s, and early 1970s; the second during 
the mid-1980s; and the third crisis occurred approximately from 2002-2005 (Kersh 46–48). 
First-Generation Reform Approaches to Medical Liability 
 Health policy expert Rogan Kersh discusses reform in terms of two categories: first-
generation approaches and second-generation approaches. First-generation approaches include 
reform options such as caps-on-damage awards, whereas second-generation approaches include 
reform options like alternative dispute resolution (Kersh 43–44). As the title of the chapter 
implies, Kersh discusses the political dimensions of liability reform in his “Medical Malpractice 
and the New Politics of Healthcare.” According to Kersh, first-generation approaches are 
supported predominantly by policy-makers, while the academic community generally advocate 
for second-generation approaches (Kersh 43–67). 
 The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of 1975 and the Help Efficient, 
Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2011m (hereinafter H.R.5) are two 
examples of “First-Generation Proposals.” These policies seek to “reduce the excessive burden 
the liability system places on the health care delivery system.”n H.R.5 draws on the cause-and-
effect relationship medical liability has on the health care system. As the argument goes, medical 
liability holds physicians too accountable; as a result, physicians are forced to practice defensive 
medicine, and the quality of care improvement is inhibited.o H.R.5 plans to resolve the liability 
system’s flaws through imposing limits on medical malpractice litigation through: capping 
                                                
m Also referred to as the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2012, because 
the proposed bill is still under Congressional consideration and review 
n (HEALTH) Act of 2012, Purpose and Summary 
o (HEALTH) Act of 2012, Background and Need for Legislation 
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awards and attorney fees; modifying the statute of limitations and “collateral source” rule; and 
eliminating “joint and several liability.” H.R.5 utilizes research conducted by the Pacific 
Institute, a free-market think tank, which estimates the cost of defensive medicine to be $191 
billion dollars.p The validity of McQuillan and Abramyan’s research and statistics on defensive 
medicine ought to be seriously questioned—not only is the estimate four times larger than some 
of the most generous estimates, but their research is based on earlier research that has been 
largely refuted and criticized by scholars in the field and the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO). H.R.5 provides a weak refutation to the argument that defensive medicine may be 
practiced to increase income, saying that “if an internist orders a CAT scan, the radiologist gets 
paid, not the internist.” This rebuttal does not assume income increases at a systemic level; in 
other words, hospitals, which are corporations (regardless of our lack of conceptualization as 
such)q, may enforce policies that encourage increased income. H.R.5 then makes the assertion 
that medical liability fears inhibit quality of care improvements, going on to also say the liability 
system fails to deter medical errors or promote patient safety. These points are duly noted by 
advocates of second-generation reforms as well. The question is, how will measures taken by 
H.R.5, which allegedly lower malpractice premiums for physicians, simultaneously result in 
increased disclosure and less medical error? As discussed earlier, it is naïve to reason that simply 
lessening the economic consequences a physician will face when disclosing details to a patient 
will make the physician more prone to disclosure. After all, the non-economic damages a 
physician endures (i.e., negative publicity and image) are not disappearing once a cap-on-
damage award is implemented. 
 Along with the problems already discussed, the congressional Committee on Energy and 
Commerce critique H.R.5 in terms of its federal nature. The committee recognizes that the 
current state-based systems for dealing with medical malpractice are far from perfect; however, 
the committee claims that modifications and improvements need to be made within the context 
of this general state-by-state framework. In other words, the national “one-size-fits-all” approach 
that H.R.5 endorses will not suffice. Within the dissenting views of a national approach, a valid 
point is made—such a new, “…untested legal structure…” has “…little regard for the potential 
                                                
p McQuillan & Abramyan, Jackpot Justice: The True Cost of America’s Tort System 
q G. Annas, personal communication, March 9, 2012 
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consequences.”r Furthermore, aside from its highly problematic implementation, attempting to 
resolve medical malpractice with national legislation is unprecedented—“the principles of 
medical malpractice liability and the procedures for the conduct of medical malpractice lawsuits 
have [always] been governed by state law.”s 
 The Committee of Energy and Commerce also critique the causal nature of H.R.5’s 
proposition. H.R.5’s logical train-of-thought flows in the following way: implement damage 
caps. As a result of damage caps there will be a reduction in premiums, and as an indirect result, 
medical error will diminish and high quality care will flourish. Critics of H.R.5 point out the flaw 
in the H.R.5 proponents’ reasoning by stating the following: 
Yet, data indicate[s] that today, the overall medical liability insurance market 
is not in crisis. They also show it is the direct regulation of insurance 
companies—and not a cap on non-economic damages (one of the core 
elements of H.R.5)—that is responsible for the reductions in insurance 
premiums that have been seen.t 
In light of what an overwhelming amount of data indicates, in which the above cited data 
concurs, caps-on-damages resulting in premium reduction is not realistic, and caps having such 
an intended impact is indeterminate at best. Logically, it follows that the causal link between 
caps-on-damages and a reduction in medical error is equally weak, if not weaker. Taking this 
data into consideration, instead of relying on damage caps to indirectly solve the severe problems 
the United States faces with medical error, it makes more sense that reducing medical error 
should be legislation’s first step, its direct intention, and reduction in premiums, if at all 
influenced by medical malpractice lawsuits, flow from a reduction in medical error. 
 Problems in terms of constitutionality and fairness arise with H.R.5’s caps-on-damages 
approach also. Lawyers representing patient-plaintiffs have argued caps are not only unfair, they 
are also unconstitutional. The caps are claimed to be such because they “[discriminate] between 
patients with minor medical injuries and those with severe injuries.” The reasoning here is 
simple: people with minor injuries have the potential to receive full compensation, whereas 
people with more serious injuries might get only a fraction of their owed compensation under 
capped damages.u Employing this argument, the caps-on-non-economic-damages have been 
                                                
r (HEALTH) Act of 2012, Dissenting Views 
s (HEALTH) Act of 2012, Dissenting Views 
t (HEALTH) Act of 2012, Dissenting Views 
u Gallegos, A., Caps Under Fire: The Fight for Medical Liability Reform 
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successfully declared unconstitutional by some states’ Supreme Courts, due to the fact that the 
statutes are inherently discriminatory. Maxwell J. Mehlman, a prominent scholar in the health 
policy field, advances another argument discussing the statues’ unfairness. 
… [It] seems unfair to limit the recoveries of one class of victims—those 
injured by malpractice—while permitting other tort claimants to recover more 
fully. Why should someone whose leg is mistakenly amputated, for example, 
get less than someone who loses a leg when they are run over by a negligent, 
insured motorist (153).  
As Mehlman describes in a couple of sentences above, caps-on-damages in medical malpractice 
tort cases are unfair because they prevent a victim of injury from receiving the same 
compensation they might have otherwise gotten had the tort been of a different nature (e.g. as the 
example used above proposes, compensation resulting from the negligence of a motorist).  
For the reasons listed and described above, first-generation reform approaches to medical 
malpractice are less promising than the latter, second-generation reform approaches. While the 
different first-generation approaches to reform are limited, most are simply different variations 
of damage cap proposals, second-generation reform approaches, which position medical error as 
their top priority, are large in number and diverse. Equally important to note is that second-
generation approaches are not mutually exclusive; in fact, advocates of each approach list other 
reform policies that ought to be adopted in conjunction with what they are discussing. In the next 
section of this paper, contending second-generation reform options are described, and the section 
concludes with a proposal to policy makers of the best second-generation reform package.        
Second-Generation Reform Proposals: An Abundance of Reform Proposals That Solve the 
Right Problems 
 Unlike the simple solution first-generation reform approach, damage caps, second-
generation reforms vary a great deal specifically in terms of the way they aim to resolve their 
fundamental concern, which is medical error. The various proposals’ degree of projected 
influence also varies significantly. This paper considers some of the most popular second-
generation proposals; these include litigation reform; alternative-dispute resolution; and 
enterprise liability reform. 
Litigation Reform 
 It makes sense to first discuss reform proposals that aim at altering the litigation system; 
before discussing more drastic measures, let us first discuss the least intrusive reform approach, 
9
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and the one most similar to the current system. Catherine T. Struve suggests the first measure 
that needs to be taken, one that at least seventeen states have already adopted, is implementing 
certificate-of-merit provisions (174). Such a provision would ensure that the case a plaintiff’s 
lawyer files is potentially meritorious. The certificate to file would be provided once an expert 
approves of the case at hand.  
Another litigation reform measure, also directed at experts, would change the nature of 
expert testimony. As Struve suggests, much expert testimony relies on medical experts 
describing what they would have done in a given situation, as opposed to what the general health 
care professional would have done; litigation reform needs to address this issue and provide 
modifications that would allow for a more robust systemic analysis. 
 Other litigation reform provisions take the importance of the judicial function into 
account. Emphasis on the judicial function is important, especially considering their important 
roles as gatekeepers throughout the course of a trial. If judges are to employ tests that assess 
technical or scientific expert testimony, the judge needs to understand the basic concepts of 
scientific evidence. Some people have advocated for specialized health courts that would only 
hear medical malpractice cases (Struve 176). However, the problem with this idea is that the 
selection and retention of judges may become too politicized, and interest groups’ interests may 
coincide with judicial decision-making. Yes, the same argument could be made with regard to 
general courts, but by its nature a specialized court would be more prone to such influence. 
Instead, “specialized divisions within a state’s trial court of general jurisdiction would be a better 
option,” claims Struve (177). As judges rotate into this division of the trial court, they receive 
special training through a “continuing judicial education” program that states could implement. 
   Considering the above proposals, litigation reform, in general terms, attempts to address 
the claims process, the evidence process, and judicial decision-making, respectively. While 
reforms in these three areas are all necessary, these reforms alone are insufficient. The litigation 
reform measures laid out would aim to fulfill the reform goals of compensation and efficiency, 
but how would these policies significantly reduce medical error? Furthermore, this reform policy 
fails to consider the fact that a litigation process, in general, will discourage real change in 
medical liability from occurring; as discussed earlier, litigation, an adversarial process by nature, 
does not encourage disclosure—and disclosure is absolutely necessary if we are to see a 
significant reduction in medical error. 
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 Struve’s suggestions are thoughtful and well noted. Trial reform is attractive, because it is 
a “less invasive procedure,” compared to other second-generation alternatives. Trial reform 
should be further researched and considered as a legitimate end to a better medical liability 
system. However, in light of the reservations already made about litigation, it is important not to 
presuppose that the court remains the predominant institution in instances of medical 
malpractice. In other words, litigation needs to be seen as a subsequent method of resolution, and 
not the primary approach to reform. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 The American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS) sees the medical liability 
system for what it is. The organization understands that a majority of the money medical 
professionals pay out in malpractice cases go to the costs of litigation. In light of their 
understanding, these physicians wish to see broad-based liability reforms; in their opinion, 
second-generation reforms have the ability to fairly compensate patients while reducing liability 
costs and increasing patient safety. The AAOS argues for alternative dispute resolution (ADR)—
or “non-litigious means of resolving conflict.” 
In the article “The Limits of Apology Laws,” published by the Hastings Center Report, 
Rebecca Dresser discusses how an initiative implemented to reduce medical error and apology 
laws have had a questionable impact. Medical error is reduced by coming to terms with, and 
discussing, mistakes (i.e. disclosure), and proposing ways to prevent those mistakes from 
occurring again in the future. Malpractice lawsuits deter physicians from pursuing disclosure. 
Theoretically, apology laws encourage physicians to disclose information to their patients, 
because the law prevents an apology or a sympathetic expression from being used as evidence of 
negligence in court. As Dresser points out, the majority of states that adopt apology laws only 
have provisions that “eliminate expressions of sympathy, not admissions of fault…” Dresser’s 
point illustrates the limits of apology laws; her point also implies that disclosure and litigation 
are mutually exclusive concepts. If methods other than litigation were embraced, however, and 
apologies were encouraged, results might include increased disclosure and more compensated 
patients. One critique of these ADR methods is that widespread disclosure and compensation 
would result in too much money being paid out. This point is well noted; however, are we to 
assume disclosure will always result in large payouts? 
11
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Research conducted within the past decade has made the point clear that patients mostly 
sue for non-monetary reasons. In light of these findings, ADR has become more prominent and 
popular in recent years. Patients sue mostly for disclosure (they want to discover what exactly 
happened to them), desire for an apology, and prevention of future errors to other patients. 
Different forms of ADR make these desires of patients possible, while compensating patients for 
experienced injuries at a much lower rate than would be the case with litigation. With mediation, 
patients get the remedy sought—an explanation and apology—while physicians get the 
satisfaction of a clear conscience, and the learning experience. The nature of litigation’s 
adversarial process is that there is a winner and a loser; someone at the end of the trial will be 
satisfied, while the other person is unsatisfied and will most likely become resentful of the legal 
system. ADR creates the possibility that both parties will walk away content with what was 
discussed, and what deal was obtained. 
Enterprise Liability Reform 
 A well-known and frequently cited statistic released by the Institute of Medicine claims 
“as many as ninety-eight thousand people die in hospitals each year as a result of medical errors 
that could have been prevented.” A less familiar fact: systematic malfunctions are responsible for 
ninety percent of that medical error.v The keyword “systematic” means that the medical errors 
are a result of the system, the institution, as opposed to the individual, the physician. On this 
basis alone, if we are to assume the Institute of Medicine’s figure to be correct, the current 
medical liability system is wrong in targeting the physician. 
 Bovbjerg and Berenson claim “[the] most important legal rationale for imposing liability 
on physicians and other medical providers is that doing so deters substandard practice.” In light 
of the fact that information already discussed refutes the deterrent effect of liability, imposing 
liability on physicians does not make much sense. It is particularly interesting that while a broad 
array of research mentions the predominance of systematic errors as opposed to individual errors 
in medical error, both first- and second- generation reform policies take the existence of the 
“physician”-defendant for granted— caps-on-damages, litigation reform, and alternative dispute 
resolution, are three examples of reforms that all fail to address the question of who the 
defendant is: an individual or an institution? A comprehensive approach to medical liability 
reform needs to, at the very least, reconsider what entity should be held accountable for medical 
                                                
v Obama and Clinton, Making Patient Safety the Centerpiece of Medical Liability Reform 
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error. Enterprise liability, considering the high proportion of systematic error involved in medical 
error, argues for the liability system to make health care organizations (e.g. hospitals) the 
respondent. 
 According to Michelle Mello, professor of law and public health at Harvard University, 
"[p]hysician insurers consider it infeasible to individually experience rate their subscribers. 
Physicians are sued too infrequently, and their claims experience varies too much over each 
three- or five-year period, to make experience rating actuarially feasible” (14). Institutions that 
have adopted enterprise liability, however, have insurance premiums that are experience-rated, 
because at the institutional level, experience-rating is practical. Experience-rating is a very 
attractive feature of enterprise liability; a reduction in insurance premiums as a result of safe 
practice gives a health care institution just another reason to take patient safety very seriously—
in this case, an economic incentive is present, enough to encourage any corporation (such as a 
hospital). Although the public does not like to consider them in such terms, hospitals are 
corporations, and their economic interests and perspectives regarding the administration of health 
care could facilitate great measures to improve patient safety. Hospitals with enterprise liability 
now employ workers to assess the degree of quality improvement occurring at the institution, 
and they implement policies that further encourage quality improvement.  
 Hospitals, the institutions themselves, need to lead campaigns for reducing medical error, 
because systems can do more than any individual can—“health care organizations are in a far 
better position than individual providers to see opportunities to improve patient safety and to act 
on those insights.”w Disclosure needs to be enthusiastically encouraged if we are to see great 
reductions in medical error. With respect to enterprise liability, Philip G. Peters, Jr. says the 
following:  
[Enterprise liability] in malpractice law will help hospitals create ‘blame free’ 
cultures that encourage open discussion of errors. As long as physicians remain 
at risk of individual malpractice liability, they can legitimately scoff at the 
notion that disclosure will be ‘blame free.’x 
When mistakes are made, the institutions need to take the blame. The system consuming the 
responsibility for medical error prevents physicians and other health care professionals from 
having to claim responsibility themselves, making them reluctant to the discussion of errors. 
                                                
w Peters, Resuscitating Hospital Enterprise Liability 
x Peters, Resuscitating Hospital Enterprise Liability 
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A Comprehensive Reform Proposal 
 A policy proposal with a one-size-fits-all approach, assuming the liability concerns of all 
states could be treated with the same solution, would be just as flawed as first-generation 
reform’s federal legislation H.R.5. With that being said, the policy recommendations provided 
here should be analyzed in a broad manner, understanding the intended goals each portion of the 
proposal is trying to uphold.  
What conditions does the medical liability reform system need to fulfill in order to be 
considered “successful?” If the goals of reducing medical error, upholding a patient’s right to 
safety and compensation, and resolving problems with liability insurance premiums are 
adequately met, the reform proposal is adequate—and may very well become a “success.” 
Absolutely essential to reducing medical error is disclosure; therefore, unless reform measures 
encourage professionals to disclose error, reform will not be successful. Reform measures will be 
equally flawed if they attempt to resolve fiscal concerns and in the process, limit patients’ legal 
rights (i.e., caps-on-damages). Adequate and efficient compensation is also important and needs 
to be included in proposals; compensation needs to be negotiated outside the court room if 
possible, because litigation costs increase the amount paid out significantly, which increases 
health expenditures and ultimately, insurance premiums.  
In prescribing liability policy, it makes sense to begin with how health care professionals 
are being insured. Medical liability reform proposals that wish to assure success need to include 
an enterprise liability solution, with experience-rating whenever feasible. Adopting enterprise 
liability ensures physicians they will not have to deal with the heavy financial burdens of the 
liability process, and that their time will not be taken from them. With these two burdens taken 
into account and resolved, physicians will be less prone to keep from disclosing errors. 
Disclosing errors at a more frequent rate might not only reduce medical error, but also might 
decrease the number of malpractice suits being filed. After all, “malpractice suits often result 
when an unexpected adverse outcome is met with a lack of empathy from physicians and a 
withholding of essential information.”y Adopting a liability system that could actuarially handle 
experience-rating, like enterprise liability, would also provide yet another reason for health care 
organizations to make patient safety its top priority. 
                                                
y Obama & Clinton, Making Patient Safety the Centerpiece of Medical Liability Reform 
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 For the reasons listed above, under the “Alternative Dispute Resolution” heading, it 
makes sense for litigation to be a secondary instrument in disputes, and for some form of ADR to 
be used first. A no-fault liability payout system may be a good approach to compensation under 
an alternative dispute resolution. The “no fault” approach to compensation utilizes an 
administrative agency or “health court”z to evaluate claims without reference to whether 
negligence occurred. Critics oppose the notion of no fault because they feel creating such low 
standards for compensation would not work—there is no way the number of payouts would be 
affordable. Advocates of the no-fault approach argue that even though it compensates a larger 
percentage of injured patients, it also generates lower overhead costs, and the money used to 
otherwise pay for litigation could go to compensating injury. Although a no-fault system is 
vastly different from the current liability compensation framework, the policy seems feasible and 
is worthy of consideration. All in all, no-fault liability (and systems similar to it), with quick and 
efficient payout systems, need to be endorsed by liability reform proposals. Admittedly, more 
experience with such administrative models is needed; more experimentation in general is 
necessary for no-fault liability and the alternative compensation approaches it competes with. 
 Predictable, reliable compensation for medical error depends on injury compensation 
tables and guidelines. Legislation enacted could make it that experts—including actuaries, 
economists, physicians, insurers, and judges—establish tables of injury cost data. Although 
every injury is different, general guidelines, regardless of whether they have a binding or non-
binding effect, produce compensation that is more efficient and predictable, as opposed to 
arbitrary and slow-paced. Tables that illustrate the average an injured patient receives in relation 
to their injury, facilitates in the negotiation process and prevents patients from being under- or 
over-compensated. Considering no evidence suggests medical malpractice is malicious in nature, 
compensation tables would not consider “punitive damages” when appraising injuries. 
Compensation tables ensure, as George A. Huber puts it, that in most cases “settlement is only a 
matter of using predetermined information to establish the compensation necessary to cover 
damages resulting from injury” (Huber 41–43). Because the injury suffered is only one element 
in the compensation equation, and the other elements vary greatly from patient-to-patient, tables 
should be used as guidelines as opposed to being used as mandates. 
                                                
z As opposed to a judicial court 
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 The final policy recommendation this paper chooses to discuss is seldom talked over in 
medical liability reform proposals. Nonetheless, physician work hours, and the influence this has 
on avoidable errors committed, requires our attention. In Mark R. Mercurio’s A Day Too Long: 
Rethinking Physician Work Hours, an article published by a bioethics institution, The Hastings 
Center in its Hastings Report, Mercurio considers the logic of long work hours for physicians. 
Mercurio claims there is ample evidence that long work hours can lead to increased chances of 
medical and surgical error.aa In light of this evidence, residents’ and fellows’ work hours have 
been significantly reduced. Mercurio explains that the current limits still seem inconsistent with 
“what is known about human physiology and performance,” however, “[in] any case, the present 
limit is an improvement over the old system.”bb Surprisingly to Mercurio, despite concerns and 
an eventual limit on residents’ and fellows’ hours in the hospital, there are no hour rules 
regarding attending physicians. Ironically, the workers that have no hour limitations are the 
oldest, and those with “final responsibility for patient management in the unit.”cc 
 The rationale for no time limitation may be “‘continuity of care’—trying to avoid passing 
a patient from one physician to another.”dd Yet the same concerns with respect to residents’ 
assignments to patients was trumped by the greater concern of declining performance and 
medical error; it seems difficult to understand why continuity of care would not be trumped by 
concerns of medical error for physician work hours as well. Mercurio makes his point clear when 
he concludes by saying, “if allowing a twenty-eight-year-old resident to work around the clock 
and beyond is unsafe for patients…then allowing a fifty- or sixty-year-old attending to do so 
makes little sense.”ee All of the safe-practice standards and paper pushing in the world is not 
going to resolve medical error if physicians are incompetent due to exhaustion. Medical liability 
reform, in addition to resolving inefficiency at the systemic level, needs to seriously consider 
implementing legislation that limits physician work hours under certain circumstances. 
The Hurdles of Implementation 
  Regardless of how great the intended prospects of a given liability reform proposal is, 
reforms obviously require implementation, a mechanism that puts the policy into effect. Some 
great reform proposals are disregarded and do not receive much appraise at all, because of their 
                                                
aa Mercurio, A Day too Long: Rethinking Physician Work Hours 
bb Mercurio, A Day too Long: Rethinking Physician Work Hours 
cc Mercurio, A Day too Long: Rethinking Physician Work Hours 
dd Mercurio, A Day too Long: Rethinking Physician Work Hours 
ee Mercurio, A Day Too Long: Rethinking Physician Work Hours 
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inability to be implemented. Some reforms that have great prospects, and receive great reviews 
during experimentation, still have trouble with being implemented. The reasons that reform 
proposals have trouble being implemented are plentiful. 
 Second-generation reform proposals have difficulty receiving the attention they deserve 
because medical malpractice is chiefly understood as a “legal problem.” Too often, medical 
malpractice is viewed primarily as a legal problem, and attempts to resolve the problems are 
aimed at methods of reducing litigation. For this reason, first-generation reform proposals, i.e. 
caps-on-damages, have been more successful than second-generation reform proposals. 
Reducing litigation as the intended goal, however, fails to recognize medical error in itself is 
intrinsically a problem, not just medical error’s impact on the litigation system. Research that 
suggests up to 98,000 avoidable deaths occur is being ignored. Perhaps because they take the 
harsh realities of medical error for granted, policy-makers do not see reducing medical error as 
the top priority. Medical malpractice needs to be understood by policy makers as a “health policy 
problem” first-and-foremost. Focusing effort on the adversarial legal process will not help 
medical professionals learn from their mistakes; the only impact litigation will have on 
physicians is building more resentment towards the medical liability system.  
 To really understand the true difficulty of implementing malpractice reform proposals, 
the politics of malpractice need to be discussed. Rogan Kersh provides an interesting, insightful, 
and unconventional perspective of liability reform by discussing medical malpractice’s political 
nature. Malpractice policies, like all policies, are influenced by interest groups. Some interest 
groups that benefit greatly from the current malpractice system are reluctant to endorse reform 
measures, and others go so far as using their fiscal capabilities to ensure reform measures will 
not be taken. President Bush made this obvious point during a 2004 speech, saying “trial lawyers 
pursuing their own agenda have continued to block this much-needed reform” (Kersh 60). The 
effects of malpractice reform on their profession are obviously a concern of considerable weight 
for plaintiff lawyers. First-generation reforms limit the amount some plaintiff-victims will be 
compensated, which therefore decreases the amount the plaintiff’s lawyer can make off of the 
case. Second-generation reforms go as far as considering alternatives to litigation, which 
obviously could greatly impact medical malpractice injury lawyers across the country. 
 American policy-making, in general, also has something to do with the limits of 
implementation. “Incrementalism,” a term adopted by Rogan Kersh, “explains most American 
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policy making—including health policy. Ambitious malpractice reforms, in this perspective, will 
almost inevitably be whittled down to minor changes, as has happened in most health care 
debates over the past thirty years” (65). Albeit very skeptical, this view of implementation makes 
a valid point: until the vitality of broad reform measures is understood, only minor changes to the 
current system will be implemented. First-generation reforms are very mild with respect to the 
changes they prescribe, and because of this, they are more likely than second-generation reforms 
to be implemented. 
 Because all states have different experiences with medical malpractice, it is important 
that malpractice reform be implemented at the state level. A one-size-fits-all approach to reform, 
whether it is first- or second-generation reform, is not the correct way to proceed. The 
Affordable Care Act, legislation the Obama Administration has been advocating for, will in 
effect nationalize health care in the United States. If the bill, which is under Supreme Court 
consideration now for allegedly being unconstitutional by nature, is upheld, nationalized medical 
liability reform might be worthy of reconsideration. But as of now, if the federal government 
were to create legislation that reflected some sort of second-generation reform proposal, judicial 
action would be likely to follow (Kersh 66). H.R.5, the HEALH Act of 2012, is one example of 
national legislation that, if it became law, may be struck down for going beyond the reach of the 
Commerce Clause (the Commerce Clause is how national malpractice reform would be justified) 
(66). 
 The final issue this paper addresses can be understood by asking the question: can we 
mandate compassion? Ron Paterson asks this exact question in Can We Mandate Compassion, an 
essay he wrote published in The Hastings Report. Paterson, a former Health and Disability 
Commissioner of New Zealand, wrestled with this question as a result of a New Zealand statute 
that demands compassion. Although his article is not directly related to the issue of medical 
malpractice, his inquiry forces us to reflect on, and perhaps come to terms with, the limits of the 
law. Yes, there is a chance, as small as it may be, the legislature could enact legislation that 
embraces all of the concerns and viewpoints of second-generation reform. Even if the best 
attempts to reduce medical error were implemented, does that ensure change will, in fact, occur? 
 Reform proposals that encourage disclosure are valuable. The thought is that an increased 
level of disclosure will result in less future error. In most cases this antecedent-consequent 
relationship holds true. Disclosure, however, does not simultaneously lead to less error; 
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disclosure enables physicians to learn, and from the experience, errors of that kind do not 
reoccur. Turning medical error into a learning experience for physicians is important. This 
learning experience, however, is capable of being hindered if physicians are not receptive to the 
mistakes being made. The “culture of medicine,” as it stands, encourages physicians to 
rationalize and excuse their mistakes, not to embrace them and encourage improvement. If we 
are to see a serious reduction in medical error, mistakes need to be confronted and discussed in a 
passionate manner no legislation can ensure. Certainly, for medical liability’s sake, the “culture 
of medicine” needs to change—medical schools, teaching hospitals, along with other educational 
institutions, need to emphasize the process of atonement through self-improvement. 
Conclusion 
 The aim of this paper was to discuss the highly problematic nature of the current medical 
liability system, resolve some of the most common misconceptions medical malpractice is prone 
to, and suggest reform measures that address the key concerns of the current medical liability 
system. More specifically, this paper attempted to focus on what issues are important, and the 
mechanisms by which these concerns could be addressed, and perhaps even resolved. It cannot 
be stressed enough that reform proposals, regardless of how great their resolutions are, all face 
the reality of implementation.  
Finally, the need for more experimentation has been discussed rather briefly. It should be 
made clear, that conducting more experiments on the various reform proposals is absolutely 
essential to correctly resolving the medical malpractice system. If proposals with little influence 
are implemented, it will be a waste of both money and time, and the flawed liability system will 
continue to operate in a dysfunctional manner. The empirical research that experimentation 
provides will contribute more insight and guidance as to what contending reform options are 
most suitable for the medical malpractice system. 
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